31

Now that I am more acquainted with how the type of reasoning courts use is not far from normal reasoning, I want to return back to something I heard before this familiarity and kept wondering about. It is related to the alleged applicability of the French law that forbids "conspicuous religious symbols" (LINK) in public schools on the headscarf warren by Muslim girls. Unless I am missing something here, how could that rule apply on that thing? The headscarf has a purpose. Its purpose is to prevent seeing the body of those girls by males not related to them. It has no value on its own and as much as there is no reasonable chance for being seen by men, wearing it or not doesn't matter religiously and you would see that nobody wears it. Nothing of that can be said about wearing a cross or a Yarmulke or a crescent. 
     

That was the argument against the interpretation of the law as reported in being targeting religious symbols. But the law is translated like this according to the link above. 

["Law #2004-228 of March 15, 2004, concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb which show religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools"]
However, addressing the "garb" part as having a different purpose than the "symbols" part, one could still argue that it is not the intended purpose of a headscarf and any other body covering clothes to show religious affiliation but it shows that only passively and despite all the wishes for that not to happen. So if we want to interpret that part to include anything allowing the conclusion of belonging to a religious affiliation by external parties then God knows to how far it can extend to reach.